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Foreword
This paper was presented at an ICRIER Conference on "India and China's Role in International Trade and Finance and Global Economic Governance". This conference, supported to by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was held at New Delhi, India from December 6-7, 2007. These papers, specially commissioned for the conference, are being published shortly in a book titled "Emerging Giants: China and India in the World Economy" edited by Professor Barry Eichengreen, Dr. Poonam Gupta and Dr. Rajiv Kumar. We are bringing out a few of these papers as ICRIER Working Papers for their early dissemination to a wider audience.
This paper compares the key features of the trade integration processes and the economic outcomes in China and India. It reveals that while much has already been achieved in both these economies, Chinese reforms, especially with respect to manufacturing trade, have gone further and that this is likely one of the key determinants of better economic performance of China. India has gone a long way in reducing its tariffs on non-agricultural products as well as selected non-tariff barriers but moderate protection still persists which likely adds to the hurdles faced by the Indian manufacturing sector. While India has revealed a comparative advantage in certain segments of its services sector, trade policy still retains some very restrictive features. These need to be addressed urgently if India is to fully exploit its comparative advantage in services. 
Abstract
The comparison of the key features of trade integration processes and the economic outcomes in China and India reveals that while much has already been achieved in both these economies, the Chinese reforms, especially with respect to manufacturing trade, have gone further and that this is likely one of the key determinants of better economic performance of China. Still, China's integration process so far remains characterized by a certain duality. On the one hand the opening up of trade and FDI in manufactured goods has spurred the emergence of a largely private sector. On the other hand the high level of public ownership and important regulatory barriers continue to dominate the services sectors. India has gone a long way in reducing its tariffs on non-agricultural products as well as selected non-tariff barriers but moderate protection still persists which likely adds to the hurdles faced by the Indian manufacturing sector. India has revealed a comparative advantage in certain segments of the services sector but its services trade policy is still very restrictive, even as compared to China. More generally the extent of liberalisation achieved so far in India and the outcomes it brought about suggest that the remaining goods and services trade barriers are just but one item on the list of reforms that India needs to tackle in order to promote trade-led expansion of more labour-intensive activities.
Introduction
China and India's GDP growth rates have outperformed world average growth rates and, indeed, those of other lower and middle income countries for the most part of the last 15 years. According to official statistics China has grown at an average rate of close to 10% annually during 1990-2006; a rate at which income more than doubles every seven years. Although regarded as a success, India's performance was less spectacular than China's with an approximate rate of growth of 6% annually though in reality the difference in growth rates between the two countries may be smaller. Heston (2007) , for example, points out that, according to recent purchasing power studies, officially reported national growth rates may overstate China's actual growth, which is not so much the case in India.
1 The growth of world economy in the corresponding period amounted to approximately 3% annually (Figure 1 ). As pointed out by the World Bank (2007), the two countries now account for approximately 37.5% of world population and 6.4% of the value of world output and income at current prices and exchange rates; as their per capita production and consumption approach levels similar to those of today's developed economies, as they are indeed already doing (see Figure 2) , major effects on global markets and resources * The author is an economist at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the material presented here draws on work carried out within the OECD Secretariat, in particular on Greene, Dihel, Kowalski and Lippoldt (2006) and Dihel and Kowalski (2008 Heston (2007) cites Maddison and Wu (2007) who have estimated lower growth rates than official rates (7.85% p.a. versus 9.6% for total GDP).
can be expected. Indeed, this has already been happening for some time with the great influence of China's demand and supply on the world markets observed since the beginning of the 1990s. India's overall influence on world markets, despite the several successful stories of individual companies or sectors, has been more limited so far (see Figure 3 ) but the potential is clearly there (e.g. OECD, 2007a or Lehman Brothers, 2007 . In fact, one could argue that because the economic growth is being achieved in India with less intervention by the authorities and within a democratic political system, it may be in some respects more sustainable than the growth achieved in China (see e.g. Huang, 2008) . 1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
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Source: WDI While China and India are both very populous, both have a history of central planning and inward oriented policies and both are poorer as compared to the OECD area, they are in fact two very different countries with diverging development opportunities and challenges. Some of these broad differences are revealed in These and many other differences, including the scale, scope and timing of already undertaken economic policy reforms, are reflected in the rather distinctive development paths that the two economies have been following as well as in their distinctive trade profiles. While in both China and India the share of agriculture in GDP has been declining 2 , its place has been taken primarily by manufacturing in China and by services in India. As a result in 2006 services accounted for 56% of India's GDP compared to 41% in China.
3 This is also reflected in the recent trade developments. India quite clearly has not been able to match China's conquest of the world's goods markets, even though recently more dynamism has been observed in certain segments of the Indian manufacturing sector (Lehman Brothers, 2007 ). Yet, for some time now, the developments in India's services sector have generated trade flows that are more comparable to those of China in absolute terms and are much higher than in China if we account for the economy size. Evidence is also mounting that the product composition of these two economies' trade is quite different and that, for the moment, the two enormous economies are not competing directly in the world markets (Dimaranan et al., 2007) . 4 The reminder of this paper goes deeper into the trade and trade policy developments in China and India in order to hypothesise about the implications for their own economies and the world economy as a whole. In particular it aims to shed light on the following set of questions:
• What has been the role of international trade in China and India's recent economic growth?
• What has been the role of trade policy in China and India's recent economic growth?
• What is the remaining potential for improving economic outcomes by reforming trade policy?
• What are other policies that could help these countries to further improve their integration with the world markets?
Main trade developments
General Trade Tends
China's economic transformation and integration with world markets is one of the most remarkable economic developments of recent decades: China's share in world goods trade has increased from less than 1% in 1970 to close to 8% in 2006 (see Figure 3 ). Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (2006) All this suggests that China's exceptional integration into the world economy was mainly driven by goods trade. As we discuss below, among other things, this reflects a certain duality in China's economic policy: the opening up of trade and FDI in manufactured goods that resulted in the emergence of a largely private sector 5 and the high level of public ownership and important regulatory barriers in services sectors. 
Source: IMF IFS
The product composition of China's merchandise trade has undergone a major change since the beginning of reforms with the large rise in the value of manufacturing exports and the significant increase over the years in imports of fuel, energy, and capital goods (Greene et al., 2006) . To illustrate more recent changes Table 5 presents the top 25 products (at the six-digit level of the harmonized system) exported by China in 1996 and 2006. First of all, the comparison reveals that China's exports were less concentrated in 1996 than they were in 2006; for instance the top 25 products accounted for 17% and 25% of total merchandise exports, respectively. Furthermore, a clear diversification is observed away from lower technology products such as footwear, toys, apparel and petroleum products towards ICT sector products such as automatic data processing machines, transmission apparatus and parts and inputs into electronic products, amongst others. Both the growing specialisation and the going up the value chain are manifestations of the raising sophistication of China's manufacturing sector. In the services sector, too, China has for some time already been diversifying away from transportation and financial and insurance services toward the exports of other business services (mainly professional services) as well as travel (Table 6 ).
China's major trading partners are on the export side the European Union followed by the United States and Japan ( Figure 5 ). Together, these three trading partners provided markets for just below 50% of China's total exports in 2006, and made up 34% of China's import bill. On the imports side Japan and ASEAN countries are very important and, indeed, while China has positive trade balance with the EU and the US it has negative trade balance with the ASEAN group. It is quite clear that this reflects in part greater specialisation in production in the Asia region. As Greene et al. (2007) describe China has emerged as the final processing and assembly platform for a large volume of exports originating from its Asian OECD neighbours but destined for markets in Europe and North America. With time the sourcing increasingly involves other fast growing Asian economies. China's trade and investment liberalisation has created an attractive business environment and has had a significant impact on FDI inflows. 6 FDI grew from essentially zero in 1979 to USD 636 million in 1983, to USD 60.3 billion in 2005 (Greene et al., 2006) . China has been the largest FDI recipient among all developing countries since 1993 and ranked the first in the world in terms of FDI inflows in 2002. Currently, China is the third largest recipient of FDI after the US and the UK (UNCTAD, 2005) . It is important to note however that China's FDI performance must be viewed in an international perspective. In terms of FDI inflows per capita, China ranks lower than all OECD countries save for one, and even ranks relatively low among developing countries.
7 Additionally, there are some concerns about the quality of these investment flows; much of China's FDI is relatively short-term, in labour intensive manufacturing, with foreign investment in high-tech and the services sectors lagging behind (Greene et al, 2006 ). India's recent economic dynamism has led many to compare it with China and to expect a similar dramatic insertion in world markets. However, India's trade expansion is much less impressive and its nature is quite different from that of China. Its share in world trade of goods and services has first declined steadily since the beginning of the 1970s to around 0.5% at the beginning of 1990s and then rose steadily to just above 1% currently. The compound annual growth rate of India's exports of goods and services for the 1990-2005 period was 14%-well above the world average growth of 6%. In particular, in the last five years Indian exports have increased at around 18-20% per annum-three times the rate of world trade growth. Yet, these significant increases reflect to a large extent a relatively low base; India's contribution to the growth of world trade over the period 1996-2006 amounted to a mere 2%, as compared to 20% in the case of China.
Remarkably, the recent growth in India's trade has been led by services rather than manufacturing. This is illustrated by the evolution of the structure of India's current account ( Figure 6 ) which shows a deepening negative balance on trade in goods (form -2.4% of GDP in 2000 to -4.6% of GDP in 2006) and a gradually improving balance on services trade (form -0.6% of GDP in 2000 to 1.3% in 2006)-broadly speaking a reverse of the situation in China (see Figure 4 and discussion above). A distinctive feature of India's current account is the large and consistently positive current transfers balance, driven mainly by remittances.
The deteriorating balance on goods trade reflects deepening deficits in trade of capital and intermediate goods (and raw materials to some extent) which apparently cannot be adequately satisfied by the Indian manufacturing sector. Balance on consumer goods was actually positive and growing over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Deficiencies of the manufacturing sector are also reflected in the export performance. Despite the fact that India is relatively abundant in skilled labour and capital, its manufacturing exports are highly concentrated in low-technology goods and the share of hightechnology manufactured goods in its total exports has barely changed since the mid1990s and remains under 5%, as compared to 30% for China (see Table 5 ). Indeed, India's current merchandise export structure is still heavily skewed towards petrol products, jewellery, furniture, chemical products and textiles and wearing apparel, a structure that resembles to a certain extent the structure of China's exports at the beginning of the 1990s (Table 7) . Superficially, the structure of exports seems a little more concentrated in 2006 than in 1996 but this is largely driven by the emergence of exports of petroleum oils. 8 Additionally, it is not easy to classify the direction of changes in the structure of top India's exports. On the one hand a few more sophisticated products such as motor vehicle parts made it to the top 25 products in 2006. On the other hand several traditional manufacturing products such as gems and jewellery, wearing apparel and certain food products that already dominated India's exports in 1996 have yet gained in importance in 2006. This suggests that India has not integrated into the global production networks of high technology products to the extent China did (Table 5 ). 
The still very traditional profile of India's merchandise trade is also confirmed by a more detailed analysis of its revealed comparative advantage indices and growth rates conducted by Dihel and Kowalski (2008 In addition to the analysis of revealed comparative advantage indices Dihel and Kowalski (2008) reported on two different analytical assessments that capture the skill intensity evolution of India's export mix. The methodology based on the skill intensity classification developed by UNCTAD 9 revealed that despite the rapid growth in trade flows, India has not managed to develop a high-technology export sector and that its export mix in terms of skills requirements remained stable in period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (Figure 7 ). Another classification developed by the Hamburg Institute of International Economics based on the ISIC-classification revealed that the share of high-technology manufactured goods (such as pharmaceuticals, radio and telecommunication equipment, office and computer equipment) in India's total exports has barely changed since 1996 and remains under 5%. Even the share of medium-technology products which include the whole of the chemical sector and motor vehicles has increased by less than 5 percentage points and stood at 19% in 2005. Table 8 complements these findings by presenting the World Development Indicators classification of high technology exports; they provide higher estimates of shares of high technology trade but a similar flat trend and performance inferior to that of Brazil and China. 10 Services appear to have done much better and India has emerged as a global player in information technology and business process outsourcing, as well as services related to pharmaceuticals. Mode 4-related trade has also been important amounting in value terms to over 90 % of total cross-border services exports (Dihel and Kowalski, 2007) . A process of export reorientation is clearly underway and a significant shift has taken place towards more advanced, in some cases high-skill intensive, services. Moreover, new services, such as computer and selected professional services, have emerged in India's exports to a greater extent than in other (developing and BRIC) countries. A closer look at the sectoral composition of services trade in Table 9 In terms of geographical orientation of goods and services exports in recent years India has increased its shares in all partner countries' markets but these shares remain relatively small and concern a few low-technology products. Since 2000, India ´s orientation towards OECD markets has been slowly decreasing, from 55% of its merchandise exports to only 43% in 2004. The EU remains the top destination but has seen its share of Indian exports reduced by 3 percentage points in 5 years. In merchandise trade, the rise of China as a key export destination is particularly As in many other parts of the world, but perhaps for different reasons, FDI inflows into India are shifting increasingly away from manufacturing towards services sectors. In fact, in India, FDI is heavily concentrated in services. The share of services sector in total FDI inflows rose from 5% in 1990 to more than 50% during the post-reform period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . However, likely reflecting the structure of services trade barriers (see below), the inflow of services FDI has been restricted to a few the most deregulated sectors such as transport and financial services. Between 1991 and 2005, the top six recipients of FDI have been electrical equipment (14.5%), transportation industry (11%), telecom (11%), power and oil refinery (10%) and other services sector (8.45%).
12 When it comes to FDI outflows from India, a similar concentration in services sectors is observed. The share of services in total FDI outflows increased to around 45% in the period 1999-2003. Non-financial services constitute around 36% and trade approximately 5% of total FDI outflows.
Importance of Trade in China and India's Growth
The remarkable parallel growth and trade performance in both China and India prompts the classic "chicken and egg question", namely, whether the opening up to trade drove the growth of GDP or whether trade increased simply as a consequence of GDP growth and expansion of their shares in the world GDP. To gauge the influence of trade on GDP several analysts consider the evolution of exports to GDP or exports and imports to GDP ratios. Yet, the use of such ratios can be criticised as meaningless or even misleading since exports or imports are turnover measures whilst GDP is a valued added concept. Still, as long as we remember this important distinction these measures can give us a feeling of the extent of exporting activity as compared to economy's income.
In China, clearly, the observed trade expansion reflects at least in part greater specialisation in production in the Asia region where China engages in the final processing and assembly of large volume of exports originating from its Asian neighbours that are destined for markets in Europe and North America. As mentioned above, according to certain rough approximations almost half of China's exports are the subject of such "triangular" trade though this share is higher in certain high technology products trade. Certainly, existence of such a processing activity would be reflected in relatively high exports to GDP ratios.
In this context some commentators have suggested that that the claim that China is an export-led economy might be a myth (UBS, 2007) . Processing activity is not nearly as present in India but a similar question about the actual contribution of exports to its GDP can be asked. UBS (2007) argues that despite the fact that imports and exports are rising in absolute terms when expressed as ratios of GDP, the estimate of actual value added contribution of exports to GDP is barely rising over time. Yet, the UBS (2007) analysis is itself not free of limitations; the value added contribution is calculated by using very broad assumptions about the domestic content and the shares of valued added in domestic content. 13 When this is done, unsurprisingly, the actual exports value added share for most Asian economies is far less than the exports/GDP ratio; for China this ratio is 10% and is not increasing over time as rapidly as the exports to GDP ratio does. We have taken the same approach as the UBS (2007) with the improvement that the actual data from social accounting matrices was used to measure the value added content in the final value of production by broad sector. 
Source: GTAP, COMTRADE, author's calculations
13 They assume a 50% domestic content share for light manufacturing, a range from 20% to 50% for electronics and 70% for heavy industry and resource exports. Next a constant value added to total domestic content of 50% is assumed. 14 The data comes from the Global Trade Analysis Project database. 
It is evident that both for China and India a simple export to GDP ratio statistic overestimates the actual contribution of exports to GDP. For China the simple ratio of exports to GDP is four times larger than the estimated export value added to GDP ratio (36% in 2005 compared to 8% in 1996). For India the simple ratio is 3.25 times larger (13% in 2005 compared to 4% in 1996). More importantly, however, both the simple and the more sophisticated ratios are much lower for India (e.g. 4% of exports value added in GDP as compared to 8% for China) suggesting that international trade likely plays currently a less important role in India's growth as compared to China. Moreover, this ratio has clearly been increasing for China, especially since 2000, while for India it has been lingering around the 3% level. From these figures we can conclude that trade has played a lesser role in India's recent economic expansion. This conclusion is also consistent with the fact that India's share in world trade is still currently lower than its share in world output, which is not the case for China (e.g. Bussière and Mehl, 2008) .
Trade Policy Developments
China initiated gradual and incremental economic reforms over 25 years ago, beginning the transition from central planning to a more market-based economy. Access to foreign markets, capital and advanced technology through greater integration into the multilateral trading system were important ways in which this process was meant to be facilitated. The resulting opening to world trade over the past quarter of a century is one of the more impressive aspects of China's economic reform and structural change and its accession to the WTO in 2001 can be seen as a coronation of the integration process.
As already foreshadowed, China's transition to a more open economy was a gradual and highly managed transition. It began with export processing in a few authorised special export processing zones (EPZs) along China's southern coast. By the mid1980s export processing was more widely spread and China was increasingly characterised by a two-tiered export regime: a very open export processing segment benefiting from duty-free imports and a domestic export sector that was afforded high levels of protection through tariffs and multilayered non-tariff barriers (Greene et al., 2007) .
In 1992 China declared its intention to establish a "socialist market economy" and began to make substantial tariff cuts. This process was greatly strengthened by the extensive reforms that China agreed to implement as a part of its WTO accession. These included lowering of trade barriers in almost all sectors of its economy, providing national treatment, protecting intellectual property rights, improving transparency and eliminating non-tariff barriers among others. Some of these commitments are still being implemented and this ongoing process is likely to further deepen China's integration with the world economy.
Upon accession to the WTO, China agreed to bind all its import tariffs. After implementing all the commitments China's average bound tariff on agricultural products will decrease to 15%, ranging from 0 to 65%, with the highest rates applied to cereals. For industrial goods this average will decrease to 8.9% with a range from 0 to 47%, with the highest rates applied to photographic film and automobiles and related products (WTO, 2001 ). The two panels of The trade reforms that China has embraced as a result of its WTO accession are a continuation of a long standing trend that saw a sustained reduction in non-tariff barriers and in levels and dispersion of tariffs. However, in the area of services, China's WTO commitments represent milestones (Greene et al., 2006 Greene et al. (2006) provide a detailed quantitative analysis of China's services liberalisation commitments as specified in its GATS schedule. Indices of trade restrictiveness are calculated to describe the consequences of implementation of China's commitments in five services sectors (banking, insurance, telecommunication, distribution and engineering services). 15 It is estimated that implementation of WTO commitments in banking would lower the restrictiveness of this sector to below the OECD average. By contrast, in all other sectors, despite significant liberalisation measures, the restrictiveness indices remain above the OECD average but are lower than in most developing countries covered in the analysis (see Greene et al., 2006) . Greene et al. (2006) also estimate welfare implications of China's implementation of WTO commitments in goods and services with a use of a multi-country, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model of the world economy that features increasing returns to scale and large-group monopolistic competition. Importantly, the model includes a treatment of foreign direct investment on a bilateral basis which, given the importance of foreign presence in the Chinese economy, is essential for understanding the impacts of its liberalisation. The results indicate that China itself clearly stands to gain substantially from its liberalisation. Implementation of the WTO commitments by China in goods and services sectors is estimated to increase its real income by almost 2%, while a scenario with full liberalisation is expected to yield a 3% increase in its real income, the estimates that are considered as quite high in this type of analysis.
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Despite the ambitious GATS commitments and the fact that more than a half of China's merchandise exports are generated by foreign-invested companies there is some indication that China's FDI policies may be more restrictive than trade or investment data suggest. OECD's FDI regulatory restrictiveness index which aims to 15 The approach is described in OECD (2007b), Modal Estimates of Services Barriers, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 51. 16 The estimated impact OECD economies is limited and heterogeneous across the group. This is because of the still limited extent of trade integration with the OECD area and the structure of bilateral trade flows between China and individual OECD economies which reflect divergent patterns of comparative advantage as well as differences in structure of trade barriers and geographical location. The most direct impact is expected through improved export performance of OECD countries that are already trading with or investing intensively in China but still face significant market access barriers. The observed trade patterns suggest that the impact through the market access channel is likely to be more important for Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, while the impact on other OECD economies is likely to be limited.
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measure deviations from national treatment, i.e. discrimination against foreign investment (OECD, 2006) , suggests that China's FDI policies were somewhat more restrictive than those in India in 2006, including in the manufacturing sector (see Table 12 ). Analysis of components of the total index for China in OECD (2006) reveals that the gap between China and India is largely due to cumbersome screening and operational restrictions rather than limitations on foreign ownership. Overall, the available evidence suggests that China's integration process so far is characterized by a certain duality. On the one hand the opening up of trade and, perhaps to a lower extent FDI, in manufactured goods has spurred the emergence of a large private sector. On the other hand the high level of public ownership and important regulatory barriers seem to dominate the services sectors. Services activities continue to be constrained by high entry barriers, excessive state involvement, opaque regulatory process and overly burdensome licensing and operating requirements. The full implementation of GATS commitments would imply significant reforms and liberalisation measures with important gains for China and many of its trading partners. The need for additional measures supporting the development of the sector is fully appreciated by China's authorities: the 11 th Five Year Plan for the first time emphasises development of the services sector with a view to alleviate the potential negative impact on the overall structure of industry, job opportunities and comprehensive competitiveness.
2005 has marked India's tenth anniversary as a member of the WTO and more than fifteen years of sustained reductions in trade protection. The extent of India's tariff liberalisation is well illustrated by the fall in collected customs duties expressed as a percentage of the value of imports (from more than 60% in 1990 to around 10% currently) as well as the reduction of the share of customs duties in government revenue (from above 40% in 1990 to less than 10% currently, Figure 10 ). The decreasing reliance on trade taxes reflects continuing commitment to trade liberalisation but also the shifting of revenue collection from tariffs to more efficient ways of collecting taxes by broadening the tax base and movements towards a value added tax.
Tariff reductions have been implemented across the board generating market access improvements but also entailing the added benefit of reducing tariff dispersion, and thus economic distortions and complexity (Table 13) . Over the period 1990-2005 (for which we have consistent data) the proportional tariff reductions on imports of manufacturing merchandise have gone deeper than corresponding cuts in the agricultural sector. In fact, for agricultural products the reduction in tariffs calculated on trade-weighted basis is negative with tariffs actually increasing by 2 percentage points over the period while that for manufacturing (38) suggests considerable liberalisation effort in the past. The corresponding proportional tariff cuts for agriculture and manufacturing are respectively -4% and 75%. Tariff peaks for nonagricultural products have continued falling from 30% in 2003 to 12.5% in 2006 while tariffs peaks on agricultural products have remained unchanged. By focusing non-agricultural tariff reduction on tariff peaks, India has been narrowing protection differentials between raw materials, capital goods and consumer goods. These statistics point to a significant liberalisation effort, especially in manufacturing. Yet, it has to be remembered that at the beginning of reforms India's tariffs were amongst the highest in the world and that the current trade-weighted average tariffs of close to 52% in agriculture and 12% in manufacturing still imply a significant wedge between domestic and world prices, and act as an indirect tax on exports through imports. This puts Indian producers that rely on imported inputs at a competitive disadvantage (capital and intermediate goods constitute the bulk of India's imports), and holds inefficient producers in the domestic market. The lowered but still high tariff barriers certainly do not improve the situation of low growth in the industrial sector ( Figure 11 ) which is one of the factors impeding reallocation of labour force from the agricultural sector. Tables 14 and 15 are even more revealing and show that the overwhelming majority (between 72 and 100%) of India's imports are not imported for domestic consumption but, rather, are used as intermediate inputs by the domestic manufacturing and services sectors. Table 14 presents the 10 top India's imports and shows that over 60% of India's imports on average face applied tariffs higher than 10% and bound tariffs of around 30%. Within a number of these product categories the maximum tariffs are as high as 100% and there are a number of national and international tariff peaks.
18
18 Taking the example of imports of machinery and equipment, the simple average tariff of almost 15% is entirely a production cost increasing measure-99% of imports machinery and equipment imports are used as intermediate inputs in production. Another example is 10% tariff on imports of crude oil-the biggest India's import (26% of the total). 100% of these imports are an intermediate input into the production of the petroleum products a part of which are successfully exported (9% in 2003).
Other similar examples include inputs into the production of the chemical, rubber and plastic products and services sectors such as construction, transport and electricity generation. All in all, in an alarming majority of cases, moderate to high tariff hurt mostly domestic firms that rely on imported inputs. In an effort to offset the high taxation of intermediate products and barriers to services trade, India has opted to cultivate an extremely complex system of duty exemption schemes, special investment and establishment rules and special economic zones (SEZs) that provide incentives particularly to exporting firms. There are more than a hundred duty exemption acts in place covering all types of activities from restaurants to agriculture, handlooms, leather and footwear or gems and jewellery. The majority of special initiatives involve some type of import duty exemption, in general between 2.5% and 5% of the FOB value of exports. For sectors dominated by very small players, specific instruments are in place to channel duty-free imports through trade associations. Other schemes such as the export promotion of capital goods scheme (EPCG) promises a 5% duty for imports of capital goods subject to an export obligation equivalent to 8 times the duty saved over a period of 8 years. Agri-export 28 zones grant duty-free imports of capital goods. In the last few years, each financial bill has added to the number of special focus initiatives and other promotional measures undermining parallel efforts to simplify export procedures such as efforts to launch an automated electronic environment for all exports.
There are currently no signs that the system will be simplified in the near future but it appears that the Indian government is planning to alleviate the burden on domestic industry. Indeed, in 2006 the Trade Minister Kamal Nath announced two new schemes Focus Products and Focus Markets aimed at providing a thrust to employment generation, particularly in semi-urban and rural areas. The objective of the Focus Products scheme is to promote exports of labour intensive industrial products by allowing a duty credit facility at 2.5% of the FOB value of exports on fifty percent of the export turnover of notified products such as value added fish and leather products, stationery items, fireworks, sport goods and handloom, and handicraft items. The Focus Markets scheme aims at promoting exports to specified markets and allows duty credit facility at 2.5% of the FOB value of exports of all products to the notified countries.
Various reports dealing with India's services sectors highlight particular problems related to market access in financial, telecommunication and distribution services. The OECD (2007) assessed barriers in banking, insurance, telecom (fixed and mobile), and distribution service and liberalisation effects in many countries, including India.
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The study employs various alternative weighting methods and improved econometric specifications that include barriers affecting each mode of services supply and additional sector-specific regulatory variables and draws conclusions that India is quite restrictive in banking, insurance, mobile telecom, and distribution, as compared to both OECD and selected emerging markets (Figures 12 through 14) . 20 The TRIs are well above the OECD average and most of the selected emerging economies, including China. Moreover, most of these services sectors have for a long time been in the public domain and they suffer not only from high barriers to trade, but also from domestic constraints in terms of burdensome regulatory measures and state monopolies. These services consequently suffer from inefficiencies and low growth. The negative impact of restrictions on the performance of banking and distribution services is elaborated on in more detail in Kowalski and Dihel (2007 The goal of the New Foreign Trade Policy is to double India's percentage share of global merchandise trade within the next five years. In 2004 when the government announced the new policy this was interpreted as achieving a 20% growth per annum in exports and increasing India's share in world trade from 0.8% to 1.5% by 2009. As far as means are concerned, the New Foreign Trade Policy 21 appears to be based on: continuing liberalisation efforts by reducing tariffs, unshackling controls, simplifying procedures and bringing down transaction costs; extensive use of duty rebates and exemptions to neutralize the incidence of all levies and duties on inputs used in export products; establishing export processing zones, so called special economic zones, to boost exports and harness FDI into infrastructure building
The objective set for the New Foreign Trade Policy must be seen as quite ambitious. Figure 15 traces the historical trend in exports growth and the projected, much higher, growth that would be implied by the New Foreign Trade Policy. Whether the means the government envisages will be sufficient to achieve such an ambitious outcome is unclear. In particular it is unsure whether export-related duty exemptions and preferential treatment of economic agents operating in the SEZs are the best way to promote economic efficiency and growth. While strong exports are the sign of an economy's competitiveness and the source of foreign currency earnings, exporting firms do not operate in a vacuum and discriminatory exports-oriented policies may in some circumstances produce more harm than good. At a very general macroeconomic level, maintaining moderately high import tariffs with a system of export-oriented duty exemptions can be called a system of "negative incentives"; costs of production are higher than in less protected transition countries except for those Indian producers which are already capable of exporting (Kowalski and Dihel, 2007) . This is bound to have a negative impact on the Indian economy in general and perhaps even on exports since this activity is also carried out within an inefficient national economy. Indeed, as much as 75% of the capital in the SEZs originates from domestic sources. Is it plausible to expect increased investment in exporting activity with policies that do not encourage the efficient domestic production? 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9
Historical Objective
Source: authors' projection based on assumption of 6.5% world trade and WDI data on Indian exports.
It is also uncertain that the Indian SEZs can develop and generate economic benefits to the extent those in China do. This is because they tend to be sub-optimally sized, which prevents realisation of scale economies, and are usually located in the vicinity of already large cities magnifying the already existing diseconomies of Indian agglomerations (Mitra, 2008) . All these elements suggest that the net economic benefits of the current web of SEZs for India as a country are uncertain, notwithstanding the private sector or government support. More generally, SEZs are always a suboptimal policy from an economic point of view (Engman, 2007) . They can merely provide an interim solution to countries with poor business environments where bridging deficiencies at a national level is temporarily impossible. This may indeed be the case in India-a large, low income country with enormous population, poor infrastructure and fiscal problems-but it would not be rational to treat this as a sustainable long-term solution that can substitute for reforms aimed at making business easier for everyone. Even as a temporary solution, the benefits are not guaranteed especially if the rents associated with operating within SEZs create perverse economic incentives.
In this context the two main elements on India's New Foreign Trade Policy seem somewhat contradictory. On the one hand the across-the-board liberalisation efforts are to be continued. On the other hand duty exemptions and other privileges geared mainly towards export promotion are to be enhanced. In fact, if the first objective is realized, the second, at least when it comes to import duty exemptions, becomes redundant. It seems that across-the-board import duty reduction could have more beneficial economy-wide and export effects than selective duty exemptions in export sectors, especially because this is the only logical end point. We therefore argue that, 32 if SEZs are to stay as an interim policy in India, a proper cost-benefit analysis of the current SEZs system and across-the-board liberalisation is warranted to minimize any potential inefficiency.
In addition, a number of studies point out several other factors that impede the development of the tradable sectors in India as well as that of the economy as a whole (e.g. OECD, 2007a). One of the key hurdles to Indian productivity growth has been a lack of infrastructure support from the government. In 2005, infrastructure spending was US$28 billion in India (3.6% of GDP), compared with US$201 billion in China (9.0% of GDP). It is estimated that poor and poorly used infrastructure cuts India's growth rate by about 1 to 1.5 percentage points a year 22 and without change the desired double-digit growth seems highly unlikely.
India-based enterprises still face significant challenges in terms of the ease of doing business despite the dismantling of the Licence Raj 23 in 1990. For example, the cost for a start-up is much greater than in China. Despite significant reforms in the area of licensing systems, much more time to obtain the necessary licenses is needed in India than in China or other countries in South Asia. Furthermore, the time required for exporting and importing and its cost to export and import remain much higher than in China. The enforcement of contracts remains inefficient and extremely difficult. Last but not least, labour regulations are inflexible, as reflected by the rigidity of the employment index that is much higher than in China or other South Asian economies. Finally, somewhat similarly to China, India is confronted with skill problems due to low educational standards though, as opposed to China, it will have increasing working population for another generation (e.g. Lehman Brothers, 2007) . Overall, the remaining protection in both goods and services sectors is still much higher in India as compared to China or other BRICs. First, this means that intermediate inputs and capital goods-the bulk of India's imports-remain expensive. Second, the remaining trade barriers and the complexity of the system combine with the high levels of domestic red tape restricting new entry and competition to keep India's competitiveness at low levels, particularly in agriculture and manufacturing sectors. As a result, pro-competitive effects in the tradable sector-the main driver of growth in most transition countries-are not as common as they could be.
Conclusion
The comparison of the key features of trade integration processes and the economic outcomes of China and India reveals that while much has already been achieved in both these economies in terms of opening up, the Chinese reforms, especially with respect to manufacturing trade, have gone further and that this is likely one of the key determinants of better economic performance of China. The evidence gathered suggests also that international trade will likely remain a crucial factor that can allow China and India to continue, or perhaps even speed up, the growth enjoyed in the last decades.
Of the two countries, China is probably a better example to be followed as far as trade policy is concerned but China's integration process so far remains characterized by a 34 certain duality. On the one hand the opening up of trade and FDI in manufactured goods has spurred the emergence of a largely private and dynamically growing sector. On the other hand the high level of public ownership and important regulatory barriers continue to dominate the services sectors. The full implementation of China's GATS commitments would likely imply significant reforms and liberalisation measures with important gains for China and many of its trading partners.
India has gone a long way in reducing its tariffs on non-agricultural products as well as certain non-tariff barriers but moderate protection still persists which likely adds to the costs of intermediate inputs and, thus, to the hurdles faced by the Indian manufacturing sector. India has revealed a comparative advantage in certain segments of the services sector but its services trade policy is still very restrictive, even as compared to China. The extent of liberalisation achieved so far and the outcomes it brought about suggest that the remaining goods and services trade barriers are just one item on the list of reforms that India needs to tackle in order to promote trade-led expansion of labour-intensive activities. Other important priorities analysed elsewhere (e.g. OECD, 2007a and Kowalski, 2008) include, for example: reforming small scale industry policies that prevent realisation of economies of scale and productivity increases in the sector; relaxing of labour market rigidities that hinder the inter-industry and interstate labour mobility and underpin misallocation of resources across industries and states; tackling infrastructure bottlenecks; reducing regulatory differences across states.
